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I.. Introduction 
Robert Keohane has suggested that small powers may play three diffe-
rent roles in the politics of a military alliance, that of a ,doyal» ally, that 
of a «super-loyal» ally, and that of a «moderately independen\» ally.' 
The loyal ally of the United States tends to support American policies 
by word and deed, and when its policies diverge from those of the 
leading power,it attempts to mute the difference and to avoid embarras-
sing the United States. While the loyal ally faces the risk of being 
ignored by the alliance leader, the super-loyal ally will seek to acquire 
bargaining power in the alliance through a policy of unquestioning and 
high-profiled support for the alliance leader, e.g. through a policy of 
being «holier than the Pope». Alternatively, a policy of moderate inde-
pendence may also give influence in the alliance and with its leader 
through a discrete flirtation with neutralism. This «threa\» must be a 
subtle one, however, in order to avoid the risk of being written off by 
the alliance partners. 
Robert Keohane, writing in the early 1970's, mentions Denmark and 
Norway as examples of loyal allies,' and in an article written in the 
winter of 1979-80 the present author came to about the same conclu-
sion: 
«At times they (i.e. Denmark and Norway) may slow down the speed 
of the boat, but they have never rocked it the way France has. In an 
alliance where any disagreement has the tendency to be viewed as a 
symptom of crisis or malaise, it is surely important to have at least 
some members who do not question its central tenets and features.»' 
Since then Denmark (now followed by Norway under the new 
Labour government) has become a so-called «footnote member» of 
NATO, which has indicated her disagreement with the NATO 
mainstream and especially US policies on a number of occasions and so 
become a target of criticism of her major allies, particularly the United 
States. The epithetofthe loyal ally may therefore not apply any longer. 
Anyhow, it seems appropriate now to have a second look at the evolu-
tion of Denmark's NATO policies over nearly 40 years in order to judge 
whether the recent trend towards increasing independence in alliance 
politics represents a rupture of traditional alliance policy, which is what 
the bourgeois political parties in Denmark argue, or whether there is an 
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important element of continuity between the NATO policy of the 
1980's and those of the preceding decades; this is what the Social 
Democratic party which has spearheaded the changes maintains. 
To analyse the recurrent patterns and (potential) new departures in 
Danish NATO policy a number of key decisions or key decision sequ-
encies over the 1945-1987 period will be discllssed within a broad-
theoretical framework which focuses on the interrelationship between 
domestic policy, alliance policy and policies towards the «adversary», 
in caSll the Soviet Union. These key decisions fall within four distinct· 
chronological periods, each with their own characteristics, Le. 1945-
49, when the decision was taken to join the Atlantic Alliance; 1949-61 
when the basic adaptation to alliance membership took place; 1962-78 
when Danish NATO policy was consolidated, and finally the period 
after 1979 when domestic consensus over security policy has been 
severely strained and when Denmark has taken on a kind of opposition . 
role in NATO, especially with respect to nuclear weapons policy. 
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U. Alliance, Adversary and 
olherGames 
I n a recent arlicle Glenn Snyder discusses the interplay between natio-
nal strategies in- what he terms the «alliance game» and the «adversary 
game».' The alliance game refers to politics within an alliance, i.e. in 
the present case to Danish policies towards intra-alliance problems 
such as NATO's organization, its decisional structure, the balance be-
tween the United States and Western Europe, burden sharing and politi-
cal solidarity in the alliance, etc. The Adversary game is concerned 
with politics between opposing alliances and nations; in the present 
case it relates to Danish policies towards the Soviet Union and other 
Warsaw Pact countries, as well as to NATO's policies and strategies 
towards the East in general. 
In both games, two main strategies can be chosen: a «C» strategy (for 
«cooperation») and w(D» strategy (for «defection»). In the alliance 
game a «C» strategy implies strong political support for the alliance and 
the allied nations, a credible commitment to their defence and firm 
adherence to the alliance «mainstream» in political and strategic questi-
ons; this is a policy ciose to Keohane's definition of the loyal ally. 
Conversely, a «0» strategy implies conditional support for the alliance, 
a weak and ambiguous defence commitment and a tendency to adopt 
independent policy postures in the alliance; this is close to what 
Keohane terms moderate independence. In the adversary game a «C» 
strategy stands for a conciliatory, non-provocative, detente-oriented 
policy, while a «0» strategy represents a posture of firmness, resi-
stance and deterrence. 
Alliance and adversary strategies are obviously linked in a number of 
ways. Alliances are usually chosen in order to gain protection from an 
adversary which is seen to threaten national security. Furthermore, cer-
tain strategies in the two games naturally «go togethen), e.g. a «C» 
strategy in the alliance game with a «D» strategy inthe adversary game 
and vice versa. Finally, strategy choices in one game effects the pros 
and cons (or «goods» and «bads» as Snyder rather inelegantly calls 
them) og strategies in the other game. 
In the alliance game the principal «bads», i.e. outcomes to be 
avoided, are «abandonment» (being deserted by the alliance) on one 
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side, and «entrapment» (losing freedom of maneuvre to the allies) on 
the other side, while the principal «goods» are security (being protected 
and guaranteed by the allies) and influence, e.g. the ability to restrain or 
influence allies. In the adversary game the corresponding «bads» are 
provocation and increased tension on one side and encouragement of 
the adversary (i.e. appeasement) on the other, while the principal' 
«goods» are deterrence (or defeat) of the adversary and confl ict resolu-
tion or reduction, respectively. 
To complicate things, the goods and bads of either game tend to be . 
mutually exclusive. In an alliance, it is normally not possible for a 
nation to have both a perfect alliance guarantee and perfect freedom of 
action, just as it is difficult simultaneously to reduce both the risks of 
abandonment and entrapment. Normally a nation will have to choose 
between maximising security and accepting the risk of a degree of 
entrapment or, alternatively, maximising freedom of action with the 
concomitant risk of being abandoned or at least less securely protected 
by its allies, when the chips are down. 
In the adversary game, a similar dilemma arises between a strategy 
of deterrence and defence with its attending risk of increasing tension 
and conflict on one side and a strategy which aims at tension-reduction 
while accepting the risk of some appeasement of the adversary on the 
other. 
This «composite security dilemma» can be summed up in the follo-
wing table from Snyder's article, which illustrates the most probable 
combinations of alliance and adversary strategies and their probable 
positive and negative consequences.' 
To sum up, Snyder postulates two alternative alliance strategies, one 
of which could be termed loyalty and the other one moderate indepen-
dence, and also two adversary strategies, one of deterrence and defence 
and another one of detente. He furthermore suggests, that a policy of 
alliance loyalty tends to go together with a deterrent posture vis-a-vis 
the adversary, while a detente policy will often go together with an 
independent role in intra-alliance policy. Obviously this logical orde-
ring of things represents a simplication - also an over-simplification-
of a highly complex reality, which is characterized by nations' manifest 
desire to have their cake and eat it, i.e. to have all the «goods» of both 
games and to avoid all the «bads». Examples of national attempts to 
evade the dilemmas are legio. But also within the NATO alliance att-
empts are made to have the best of both worlds vis-a-vis the Soviet 
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Table I. The Composite Security Dilemma in a Multipolar System 
Possible Consequences 
Strategies Alliance game Adversary game 
((Goods» «Goods» 
l. Reassure ally. 1. Deter. or prevail 
reduce risk of over, adversary 
I abandonment 2. Enhance reputation 
2. Enhance reputation for resolve 
Alliance C: for loyulty 
«Bads» 
Support, (Bads» l. Provide adversary; 
strengthen commitment l. Increase risk of increase tension; 
entrapment insecurity spiral 
Adversary D: 2. Reduce bargaining 
Stand firm. 
power over aUy 
3. Foreclose realignment 
option 
4. SolidifY adversary's 
alliance 
«Goods» (Goods) 
l. Restrain aUy. reduce l. Resolve conflict; 
risk of entrapment reduce tension 
11 2. Increase bargaining 
power over ally 
Alliance D: 3. Preserve realignment «Bads» 
Withhold support, 
option l. Encourage adversary 
4. Divide adversary's to stand firmer 
weaken commitment 
alliance 2. Reduce reputation 
Adversary C: for r(!soive 
«Bads» 
Conciliate I. Increase risk of 
abandonmelu 
2. Rt:duce rcpmu(ion 
for loyally 
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Union, most notably in the Harmel formula of 1967 which defines 
NATO's over-all policy as one of both deterrence, defence and detente. 
But the dilemmas of alliance policy stem not only from the intricate 
interplay of the alliance and adversary games. There is a third game as 
well, the domestic politics game, which adds to the complexity. A 
government cannot formulate its alliance and adversary policies in a' 
void; it has to have domestic support for its policies hoth from the 
public and the parties in parliament. Typically, a government will want 
to have a broad security policy consensus hecause this increases its' 
credibility vis-ft-vis both allies and adversaries; therefore the politics of 
domestic consensus-building becomes an important aspect of national 
security policy. 
The Danish reaction to the dilemmas of the alliance and adversary 
games has typically been one of wanting to have the best of both worlds 
and to pursue a strategy in the alliance game which combines a credible 
alliance guarantee with a measure offreedom of action both within and 
outside the alliance and a strategy in the adversary game which is very 
close to the Harmel formula, Le. a mixture of deterrence, defence and 
detente. But accents have varied over the decades, depending both on 
changes in the international environment and in Danish domestic poli-
tics. 
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Ill. The Decision to Ally 
(1948 49) 
In the wake of World War 11 Danish governments (Knud Kristensen 
(Lib) 1945--47 and Hans Hedtoft (Soc.Dem.) 1947-50) sought to steer 
a course of reliance on the U. N. and of «bridge-building» between East 
and West - a policy which, though phrased in terms of international 
solidarity etc., soon became rather indistinguishable from old-time 
neutrality. Despite attempts to equivocate between the budding great-
power blocs, the Soviet Union was clearly viewed as the potential 
adversary, but the policy chosen was one of the conciliation and rap-
procl,emelll, e.g. through a trade agreement concluded in 1946. At the 
same time, although the Western powers and still more her Nordic 
neighbours were seen as natural allies in an emergency, the prevailing 
attitude was one of the opposition to alliances and blocs. As late as 
January 30, 1948, Prime Minister Hedtoft warned against placing Den-
mark in any bloc. Until 1948, therefore, Denmark refused to play the 
alliance game, and in the (hardly recognized) adversary game she chose 
to adopt a co-operative «C» strategy. 
But soon the need for security and the fear of abandonment came to 
dominate Danish security policy. During the «Easter crisis» of March 
1948 the Hedtoft government started its search for external guarantees 
and weapons deliveries to offset what in a glimpse it had come to see as 
the critical vulnerability of Denmark to a Soviet coup-de-main. Danish 
government offIcials from now on saw their country as potentially the 
most vulnerable in Western Europe, and this perception persisted long 
after Denmark had been included under the protective shield of NATO. 
In its search the Hedtoft government came to concentrate on the option 
of a Scandinavian defence union and to prefer a union based on non-
alignment between East and West (which the Swedes demanded) rather 
than on limited alignment with the West, which was the Norweigan 
pre-condition. In this perspective, the Danish decision to sign the North 
Atlantic Treaty represented only the third-best option on its scale of 
preferences. ' 
Fear of entrapment played a major role in ordering Ihese Danish 
priorities. This particular problem was absent with respect to a Nordic 
alliance, while it was feared that association with the United States -
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still a relatively unknown quantity in international affairs - might 
involve Denmark against its will in faraway conflicts. It was only after 
receiving assurances that in some circumstances (e.g. an attack on Ala-
ska) <<it would be preferable for some parties not to declare war ... but to 
take other appropriate measures»' and after appreciating the vagueness 
of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that this fear was stilled - if 
only partially. 
Perhaps paradoxically, also need for security/fear of abandonment 
pointed in the Scandinavian direction, at least in the prevailing view: 
Obsessed with the fear of a surprise attack a la April 9, 1940, and 
initially not very well versed in the novel and arcane concept of deter-
rence, Danish politicians were particularly focused upon the possibili-
ties of receiving prompt assistance in place if an attack should occur. 
The Western Powers could not conceivable promise such assistance, 
but the nearby Swedes - at the time a major military power - might be 
able and wiJIing to do so. The Scandinavian Pact aborted for other 
reasons, and so the Danish government was spared the realization that it 
had greatly exaggerated Sweden's capability and will to assist, but its 
fears of abandonment and need for security persisted even after she had 
learned about and begun to internalize the basic, war-preventing stra-
tegy on which the Atlantic Alliance was originally built. Especially, the 
govemmentcontinued to fret about the country's vulnerability to a sud-
den Soviet attack and about the inability of the Alliance to intervene 
with reinforcements in time to repel it. 
This problem was exacerbated by considerations stemming from the 
adversary game. While a Scandinavian Pact was seen as a tension-
reducing device, the Atlantic Pact could be viewed as potentially 
increasing international tensions. Especially it was feared that Danish 
adherence to it might provoke the Soviet Union to attack Denmark 
before the Pact's defenses had been built up and its guarantee become 
credible. Before entering the Pact, the Danish government therefore 
sought specific reassurances - which she got - that its aim was war-
prevention and defence, and that the United States was not contempla- . 
ting military bases in Denmark. 
The decisive factor for Denmark's entry was, however, that she did 
not have much choice. Joining the alliance was by far preferable to-
standing alone in isolated neutrality, and complete guarantees were not 
to be had, as Prime Minister Hedtoft told the parliamentary foreign 
relations committee.' Assurances received during the final negotiation 
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phase helped tu still the original fears of abandollmelll, entrapment and 
provocation of the Soviet Union and to make the alliance guarantee 
mure credible, but large problems persisted. Temperamentally Danish 
puliticians, and especially Social Democratic politicians, were unpre-
pared for playing both the alliance and the adversary games, and ente-
ring the alliance. was therefore the beginning of a major learning pro-
cess. In this perspective,the 1950's had the character of a period of 
basic adaptation to these games which was not completed until the early 
1960' s when a combination of international detente and the build-up of 
West German forces helped to relieve the Danish vulnerability synd-
rome. 
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IV. Policies of Adaptation 
1949 61 
Danish security policy in the 1950's and early 1960's can most adequa-· 
tely be conceived of in terms of adaptation, both to working within a 
multilateral alliance and - in a wider sense - to participating in great 
power politics, although, of course, in a minor role. Both contexts were· 
new to Danish politicians, and adaptation to them took place only gra-
dually and differentially. 
During the alliance negotiations of 1948-49 significant differences 
had cropped up between the political parties. The dominant Social 
Democratic party had been the primary spokesman for a Scandinavian 
defence union - preferably of the non-aligned variety - but had swung 
into a cautious support for joining the North Atlantic Treaty, when 
Nordic possibilities petered out in the beginning of 1949. This turn-
about was welcomed by the Liberal and Conservative opposition par· 
ties who had argued for a Western alliance all along, even if they prefer-
red a Nordic setting for it, and these three parties, the Social Democ-
rats, the Liberals and the Conservatives voted through the new alliance 
orientation in Parliament in March 1949. Opposed to the Pact were the 
Radical party, social-liberal, but neutralist and anti-militaristic, and the 
Communists, while another minor party, the Justice Party, was divid-
ed. 
This remained the overall constellation in the domestic game during 
most of the 1950's. But differences within the dominant security policy 
alliance were never totally eradicated. Under a Liberal-Conservative 
coalition government from 1950 to 1953 cracks in the Atlantic coalition 
started to appear, as the Social Democrats grew increasingly critical of 
certain aspects of its foreign and defence policy, and after 1953 the 
Radicals began to play a role in security policy as the parliamentary ally 
of successive Social Democratic governments and - from 1957 - as a . 
member of a coalition government partner also meant that the Radicals 
had to underwrite the basic security policy line of 1949, Le. NATO 
membership and a certain defence effort. By the early 1960' s the Radi- . 
cals had therefore joined the broad security policy consensus which at 
that time counted as many as 164 out of the 175 members of the Folke-
ling. Only the new People's Socialist Party which had arisen in the late 
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11)50's from the ashes of the Communist party were now in basic 
opposition to the official security policy line. 
As discussed earlier the alliance and adversary games are closely 
interconnected, and both are also intertwined in the domestic game. 
Any attempt to isolate these games would therefore be rather mislea-
ding. On the ot/:ler hand, some issues tend to be treated more in the 
context of one game than others. Of the three main issue-areas in 
Danish alliance policy in the 1950's one, the area of military and politi-
cal integration in NATO, was treated almost entirely in terms of the 
alliance game; another, defence policy proper, was primarily decided 
within the domestic game, though with some inclusion of the alliance 
game, while a third main area, base and nuclear weapons policy, was 
primarily decided in terms of the adversary game. 
Denmark and NATO Integration 1949-61 
The Creation of NATO 1949-51 
As a consequence of the way Denmark entered the Atlantic Alliance, 
her politicians were even less prepared than their colleagues in other 
countries for the political and military developments which in less than 
18 months transformed it into a highly integrated military organization. 
The American proposals of September 1950 for an integrated military 
force in Europe took the Danish government by surprise and, in addi-
tion, presented it with several difficult problems. First, by reducing the 
vagueness inherent in Article V it raised the fundamental problem of 
further entrapment and reduced the freedom of maneuvre in a crisis. 
Secondly, the German problem -a century-long trauma in Danish poli-
tics - was acti vated through the proposal to include a German contribu-
tion in the integrated force. Combined with the parliamentary weakness 
of the Hedtoft government (it resigned a few weeks later) these pro-
blems were enough for Denmark to call for a recess of the North Atlan-
tic Council meeting in New York, but not - as could be expected - to 
reject the proposed scheme. In the resumed Council meeting on Sep-
tember 26, 1950, Denmark accepted the American proposal on certain 
understandings, among them that the purpose of the integmted force 
would be to defend the whole of Western Europe, including Denmark, 
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that the NATO defence line should be moved as far to the east as pos-
sible in Germany, and that the basically civilian structure of the alliance 
should be maintained with the Council as its supreme body of 
authority. ' 
This decision to acquiesce in the American proposal was mainly 
predicated on two considerations. First, freedom of action was natu-
rally limited in a question which went to the root of the alliance's per-
formance, and in which the United States and most other member 
countries had invested considerable prestige. As Foreign Ministe'r 
Gustav Rasmussen told party representatives: Denmark had a veto 
power in the Council, but it was formal and not real. '" But the decisive 
consideration was one of security and fear of abandonment. As mentio-
ned above the government had been sceptical in 1948-49 as to the 
ability of the Western powers to defend Denmark's vulnerable «under-
belly» in the Baltic and Schleswig-Holstein. Danish efforts during 
1949-50 to secure the stationing of Allied forces in Schleswig-Holstein 
had proved of little avail, and with the realization that Denmark was 
lying way in front of the Pact's main defence line on the Rhine, acute 
fears of abandonment and even second-thoughts about the wisdom of 
joining the alliance had gripped leading politicians like Prime Minister 
Hedtoft. «Denmark wants to be defended, not liberated», as he COm-
. plained to U.S. Ambassador Anderson. The possibility that the estab-
lishment of a joint, integrated force in Europe might contribute to a 
solution of Denmark's delicate security situation was probably the 
singe most important factor in the Danish decision to accept the Ameri-
can proposal. As Social Democratic spokesman Poul Hansen told the 
Folketing in October, Denmark's geographical position was so expo-
sed that hardly any country could have such an interest in the joint 
force. Besides strengthening the alliance in a general way and hence 
NATO's deterrence of the Soviet Union, the plan offered the prospect 
of increasing the protection of Denmark by moving the defence line 
eastward from the Rhine. lI This, it was realised, presupposed the rear-
mament of Western Germany, and for this reason the security policy· 
majority acquiesced in the prospect of seeing a German military power 
south of the border once more. 
The domestic and adversary games hardly played a direct role in the: 
Danish decision. The government did not reel strong enough to make a 
decision without consulting the opposition parties, but the final accep-
tance was made by the NATO majority without taking heed of protests 
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from the anti-NATO parties. Similarly, evaluations of the potential 
effects of the decision on East-West relations or Denmark's relation-
ship with the Soviet Union were largely absent, apart from the hope that 
NATO integration would increase the alliance protection of Denmark 
towards Soviet aggression. 
The Greenland Base Agreement 1951 
Denmark' 5 possession of Greenland was a major reason for the Ameri-
can interest in having Denmark included in the alliance in the first 
place. Denmark proper was generally considered indefensible and u 
military liability, rather than an asset. On the other hand, bases in Gre-
enland had proved useful to the United States during World War 11, and 
after the War Greenland was considered one of the most important 
strategic base areas outside the American continent together with Ice-
land and the Azores. During Danish-American negotiations in 1947-48 
about the future of the 1941 base agreement, the U .S. wish to retain its 
base rights was very clearly stated, and in the spring of 1948 the Danish 
government had to give up - at least for the time being - its efforts to 
have the 1941 agreement abrogated and Greenland cleared of American 
troops." Before Denmark entered NATO the Greenland problem was 
often cited as an important reason for joining, because the alliance was 
seen as a more suitable, multilateral framework for securing the 
defence of Greenland than a bilateral Danish-American arrangement. 
Little is known about the actual negotiations which produced the new 
base agreement of April 27, 1951." The agreement was concluded for 
the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty and construed as «in imple-
mentation of» the Treaty, but actually it was a bilateral arrangement. 
The Danish government had also hoped for a reduced or even token 
American presence in peacetime, but such hopes foundered on the 
American demand for a sizeable peacetime defence of Greenland 
which Denmark could obviously not deliver and for a broad freedom of 
action in Greenland. These American demands were now prompted 
less by views of Greenland as a useful «stepping-stone» on the way to 
Western Europe, which was how Greenland was referred to in the 
Atlantic Pact negotiations, than by the new polar perspective of nuclear 
strategy. The construction in 1951-52 ofThule Air Base in Northern 
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Greenland was a telling testimony of the increasing American interest 
in Greenland in the early 1950's. Under such circumstances, where 
major U.S. security interests were involved, the Danish freedom of 
action was extremely limited, and the Danish role in the defence of her 
northern province (which Greenland became in 1953) has remained 
rather marginal ever since. 
The Creation of the BALTAP Command (1957-61)14 
Because of the fall of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 
1954, the rearmament of the Federal Republic could only Commence 
when a new framework - NATO membership - had been created in 
1955, and even then it was not until 1957-58 that German troops could 
start to make any significant contribution to the defence of NATO 
Europe. In the meantime the southern approaches to Denmark 
remained practically unguarded, especially after 1953 when the Nor-
wegian brigade in Schleswig-Holstein was withdrawn. The Americans 
and the British refused to fill the void, and in Denmark an agreement 
could not be reached between the bourgeois government at the time and 
the Social Democrats to fill it through an increase of the Danish Army 
and its re-deployment to the south. The hopes of protection which had 
been the main motivation for Denmark's acceptance of the integrated 
NATO force in 1950 was therefore a long time in being realised and 
especially among the Social Democrats a distinct feeling of abandon-
ment was felt, or at least voiced. However, when German naval vessels 
started to operate in the Baltic in the late 1950's and military units 
began being put up in Schleswig-Holstein, an old security problem 
promised to start being solved, even though the German Army con-
tribution proved to be smaller than originally expected. 
Instead another vexing problem showed up, namely the format and 
extent of Danish-German military cooperation. The coordination pro-
blem was exacerbated by the fact, that initially the German Navy had 
been placed under the Central Region, while the land forces in 
Schleswig-Holstein - now including German units - continued to be 
under the Northern Region in Oslo. Danish interests were inevitable 
mixed: On one side, the retention of Schleswig-Holstein as a Danish 
defence glacis and the inclusion of the German Baltic navy under the 
Northern Region were evidently in the national defence interest; on the 
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other side, there was considerable reluctance at the idea of day-to-day 
cuuperatiun with the new Bundeswehr, both among Danish politicians 
and in the services, i.e. a fear of being entrapped in a close relationship 
with the erstwhile enemy who might - by sheer numbers - come to 
dominate it. 
On the German side an important consideration was to have all Ger-
mall forces under one NATO command, i.e. the Central Region. This 
interest was voiced by the Bundestag in 1954 and revived by Defence 
Minister Franz-Josef Strauss ill 1958 with the added preference for 
Denmark to be equally included in the Central Region. 
Discussions of the command structure on the borderline between the 
two regions were initiated in 1957. The Germans proposed a joint 
Gennan-Danish arrangement under the Northern Region covering all 
services, while the Danes preferred to limit it 10 the naval forces in the 
Ballic. However, these discussions were broken off by Ihe Danish 
government in 1958 after Mr. Strauss' remarks which were anathema 
to all Danish politicians. The idea of joining the Central Region imme-
diately conjured up fears of entrapment and ofloss of control, e.g. over 
national base and nuclear weapons policies. Another difficult issue was 
the German demand for military depots in Denmark, if German forces 
in Schleswig-Holstein were to be orienled lowards the North, rather 
than the West logistically. This problem was solved in 1960 by giving 
the depots in question NATO-status, i.e. by multilaleralizing the solu-
tion. 
When negotiations over the region's organizational slructure were 
resumed in 1960, it quickly became clear that Denmark's possibilities 
of stalling a new aJTangement would be limited to matters of detail, 
especially as SACEUR began to exert a discreet pressure on the Danish 
Government in support of the German demand for a comprehensive 
three-service command structure for Denmark and Schleswig-
Holstein. Very soon, the choice was narrowed down to a choice bel-
ween this option or a withdrawal oflhe regional border from the Elbe 10 
the Danish-German border. 
In the end, Denmark's limited freedom of maneuvre in a question 
where important Allied and NATO interests were at stake and her evi-
dent interest in tying the Bundeswehr and the Bundesmarine to tlle 
defence of Denmark's southern approaches once more overruled fears 
of entrapment and close contact with German military forces. In the 
rinal negotiating phase in 1961 Danish decision-makers therefore con-
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centrated on sweetening the pill; first, by getting the best possible deal 
with respect to command posts in the new arrangement. and secondly 
by diluting its bilateral character by including olTicers of other nationa-
lities in its various staffs. The government succeeded in hnth these 
ends: Denmark got an unproportionate nllmber of command posts. 
including that ofCOMBALTAP, and Allied officers were to make lip ,\ 
third of the staffs. 
In December 1961 the Danish Folketing ratified the establishment of 
the BALTAP (Baltic Approaches) Command, which started operating 
from the beginning in 1962 from its headquarters in Karup, Jutland. 
Since then, it has been a major Danish security policy goal to preserve 
the status quo within the arrangement, which has functioned almost 
friction less over the years. One salient characteristic of this has been 
the willingness to get entrapped in BALTAP, e.g. by planning for the 
deployment of the Jutland land forces to Holstein and the Hamburg area 
in an emergency. This willingness neatly illustrates the symbiotic rela-
tionship between the need for security and the willingness to get entrap-
ped. Originally (i.e. around 1960) this concept had been motivated by 
the failure of the Bundeswehr and NATO to put up as strong a covering 
force for Schleswig-Holstein as expected. This commitment is still 
mainly motivated by Danish defence calculations, Schleswig-Holstein 
being the best place to defend Jutland, but in addition it has acquired a 
symbolic aspect as a token of Denmark's continued commitment to 
multilateral defence. 
The decision to accept BAL TAP was not without domestic drama. as 
part of the Radical rank-and-fiIe rebelled against the inclination of the 
party leadership to accept BALT AP along with previous concessions to 
the official policy line as a price to be paid for continued participation in 
the government coalition. In the end, the party leadership narrowly 
carried the day, and BALTAP therefore was included in the broad secu-
rity policy consensus which crystallised in the early 1960's. 
As in 1950 considerations pertaining to the adversary game played 
only a minor role in the decision-making process. In a diplomatic note' 
of August 31, 1961, the Soviet government warned that the proposed 
joint command would seriously worsen the situation in the Baltic and 
Nordic area and that «the creation of such a situation would directly' 
affect the security of the Soviet Union»." The Soviet Union also at-
tempted to gain leverage through pressure upon Finland. On October 
30, 1961, the Soviet government initiated the so-called <<flote crisis» by 
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delllal1l1ing military consuilations with Finland according 10 the 194H 
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Assistance, i.a. by referring to 
the rise of German military influence in Northern Europe through the 
planned BAL TAP command and otherwise. Finally, both the Soviet 
Union and Poland delivered official protests after the Folketing had 
ratified the BAL-TAP agreement in December." 
Despite such pressures, the Danish government did not waver. Both 
in October and in December the Danish response centered on two the-
mes: a denial of the allegedly threatening character of the new arrange-
ment and a pointed reference to Denmark's inalienable right to judge 
for herself how best to take care of her own security. The defensive 
character of NATO, Denmark's wish to contribute to European detente 
as well as the peaceful nature of the new German democracy were also 
stressed. 
As will be noted, the Danish policy on this issue was «toughen> and 
more in terms of a ,,0» strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union than her 
policy on bases and nuclear weapons which will be discussed below. 
This probably reflected a negative reaction to heavy-handed Soviet 
pressue, much of which was probably a reflection of the simultaneous 
Berlin crisis, but primarily it showed the limited freedom of action 
which Denmark had in the alliance game in conjunction with her own 
security interests. 
Defence Policies 1949-60 
While Denmark's freedom of action has always been rather restricted 
with respect to the organizational framework of her alliance policy, 
there has always been a somewhat larger room for maneuvre when it 
comes to formulating the actual contents of this policy. Defence poli-
cies, for instance, have always been characterized by a sizeable int1u-
ence for domestic factors, reflecting the fact that defence policy has 
traditionally been one of the most heavily contested policy areas in 
Danish domestic policy. Especially in the 1950's defence policy 
remained highly politicized. 
Since 1949 the Conservatives and the Liberals have been proponents 
of a relatively strong defence posture. While not in practice ready to 
accept NATO force goals such as the Lisbon goals of 1952 or the MC-
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70 of 1957 as national goals, they consistently argue that Denmark 
should take alliance force goals as points of departure in national force 
planning. This reflects a notion that Denmark should he prepared to pay 
its due share in NATO, and that the willingness of the Allies to honour 
their security guarantee is also dependent on Denmark's own defence 
efforts. The Social Democrats have been more circumspect. Having . 
transformed itself during and after World War 11 from an anti-
militaristic position to one of support for a real defence effort, the party 
still had to take into account lingering doubts in its rank-and-file as well 
as the continued defence scepticism of the Radicals, their parliamen-
tary support party for most of the post-war period. As a consequence, 
the Social Democrats have usually argued that Denmark shall make a 
fair contribution to NATO, but that defence efforts must not be allowed 
to undermine the welfare state and in doing so the puhlic's support for 
NATO. 
During 1950-51 the basic Danish defence structure was laid down in 
a process which reflected domestic preoccupations ahout the size of the 
defence budget and the length of conscription as well as participation in 
NATO's force-planning process. The precise interplay between the 
domestic and alliance games is not very well documented. However, 
the outcome can probably best be described as a compromise. Denmark 
established, almost from scratch, a defence force, which to a large 
extent was modelled on Allied organizational and doctrinal experiences 
and which was heavily dependent on U .S. and Canadian military assi-
stance. Until the mid-1960's practically all major weapons systems for 
the services were received under the MDAP and similar programmes. 
The total amount received during this period was nearly 4.5 billion 
d.kr.," corresponding to about one-third of the Danish defence budgets 
in those years. When military assistance petered out in the 1960's the 
renewal of this initial stock of armaments hecame a major problem, 
which has continued to plague Danish defence planning to this very 
day. 
The Danish defence contribution therefore was mainly in personnel 
and operating budgets. In terms of the over-all defence budget, the 
contribution remained fairly modest, i.a. in order not to undermine 
puhlic support for the new security policy. During the building phase 
(1950-53) the government and parliament responded to NATO plan. 
ning directives by increasing both budgets and the conscription period 
considerably. The conscription period was raised from 12 to 18 months 
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in 1953 so as to increase the covering force of trained personnel, and 
defence budgets trebled from 210 mill. d.kr. in FY 1949 to 927 mill. 
d.kr. in FY 1954. But increases and the absolute level of expenditure 
were considerably less than called for in NATO plans, and after 1953 
the build-up of the defence forces levelled off again: conscription was 
reduced to 16 months in 1954 and defence budgets declined somewhat 
in real terms [roin their peak in FY 1954. By 1960 the defence budget 
amounted to some 2.4 percent of GDP. 
This trend reflects, of course, the general weakening of NATO's 
force build-up after 1953, but also domestic considerations. In 1953 the 
Social Democrats returned to power with the Radical party playing a 
pivotal role as its parliamentary support. In combination with a gene-
rally weak economy which did not really take off until after 1958, this 
largely explains the moderate expansion of the Danish defence forces in 
the 1950's. On the other hand, the increasing role of the Radicals, e.g. 
as a government partner of the Social Democrats 1957-64, was predi-
cated on their acceptance of the official security policy line and paved 
the way for a historic defence compromise in 1960 between the govern-
ment parties and the Conservatives and Liberals. The defence agree-
ment invol ved a modest increase in the defence budget - but not so as to 
even approach the NATO force goals, which at that time were one-third 
above the actual Danish contribution.'! The real importance of the 
agreement lay in the fact that it created a broad defenc~ policy consen-
sus among the so-called «old» parties and therefore took defence policy 
off the domestic political agenda as long as it lasted (i.e. to about 1968). 
One mechanism for this was the agreement to index the personnel and 
operating accounts of the defence budget to the 1960 level in real terms. 
The defence compromise was almost entirely predicated on domestic 
politics. SACEUR voiced his disappointment with the modest level of 
defence efforts which the agreement had landed upon, but was unable 
to change it. 
Base and Nuclear Weapons Policy 1952-60 
Neither in questions concerning alliance organization or the Danish 
lk:fcIlCC contribution did considerations pertaining to the adversary 
game pJay a significant role. Policies in both issues were, uf course, 
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motivated by a general need to bolster the alliance guarantee against the 
Soviet Union and by an acute - and probably exaggerated - awareness 
of a Soviet capahility both to launch a land thrust against Jutland via 
Schleswig-Holstein and a seaborne invasion across the Baltic against 
the eastern islands. 
Such threat perceptions which essentially foresaw a repetition of the 
German surprise attack of April 9 , 1940, were especially pronounced in 
the early 1950's, i.e. during the peak of the ColdWar. From 1953 such 
fears resided somewhat with the reduction of international tension, and 
strategies in the adversary game other than deterrence and defence were 
given wider scope. The evolution of Danish base policy is a case in 
point. 
The Evolution of Danish Policy 1952-53 
Before signing the North Atlantic Treaty Foreign Minister Gustav Ras-
mussen had received American reassurances that the United States 
were not contemplating bases in Denmark; this was in perfect accord-
ance with the prevailing pessimism in Washington over the possibility 
of holding Denmark in a war situation. However, the question cropped 
up again during NATO's defence planning in the early 1950's, out of 
which grew a NATO proposal to station some 150 U .S. tactical aircraft 
on Danish air bases as part of a broader effort to increase the defence of 
Denmark." 
This initiative activated both the domestic, the alliance and the 
adversary games. When the issue came up in 1952, the Liberal-
Conservative government was locked in a growing domestic strife with 
the Social Democrats, which gradually started to spill over into foreign 
and security policy. The government ran into severe trouble for its 
support for a NATO resolution on Indochina and in early 1953 it failed 
to get through a proposed increase of the Danish forces in Schleswig-
Holstein, which was intended to cushion the effect of the announced 
withdrawal of the Norwegian brigade (4000 men) from the region. 
Though in principle positive to foreign stationing in Denmark, the 
government's main consideration was that the issue might split the 
1949 coalition; it therefore chose to play a very cautious hand. An 
additional reason for this was the government's wish to carry through a 
long-prepared revision of the constitution which required maximum 
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political agreement among the four old parties. In May 1953 the 
government went us far as giving the Radicals, who were tleterminetlly 
against the stationing, a written assurance that nothing important woultl 
be decitled without their concunence until the new constitution hatl 
been ratified. '" The government duly got its signatures under the con-
stitution only to be defeated in the ensuing parliamentary elections and 
to be succeeded by a Social Democratic minority government. Dome-
stic consideration also played a major role for the new government 
party, which had to consider both the opposition of the Radicals, and 
critical aUitudes within the party itself and in public opinion. In August 
1953 (after the Social Democrats has decided against stationing) 54% 
of the public were against foreign bases, only 20% for.". 
On the other hand, the Social Democrats agreed with the Liberals 
and Conservatives that the stationing of U .S. aircraft would be entirely 
consonant with Danish NATO policy. In the view of the latter parties it 
would strengthen the defence of Denmark and increase the credibility 
of the alliance guarantee, and the Social Democrats agreed, at least 
initially. Their leader, Hans Hedtoft, saw a clear linkage between sta-
tioning, the U.S. willingness to assist Denmark, NATO's credibility as 
a war-preventing organization and the public's beliefin official policy. 
Hence a basic agreement that the need for security pointed towards the 
acceptance of the proposal." 
But gradually doubts came to play a larger role. Both the bourgeois 
parties and the Social Democrats emphasized the need to act together 
with Norway, which had already decided in 1949 not to accept foreign 
bases as long as Norway was not attacked or threatened. Especially the 
Social Democrats made a determined, though unsuccessful effort to 
change the Norwegian policy, presumably both to reduce domestic cri-
ticism and the feeling of entrapment which might arise if Denmark went 
further than Norway on this issue. The failure to change the Norwegian 
base policy in combination with a clear NOr\yegian preference for bases 
in Denmark was instrumental in cooling the Danish interest in statio-
mng. 
Another stumbling block was the still unsolved problems around the 
defence of the southern border. As mentioned, the Social Democrats 
refusetl in early 1953 to strengthen the Danish contribution to the 
tlefence of Schleswig-Holstein - on the premise that this was really" 
joint NATO responsilJility. In the aftermath this question was linked 
·wilh Ihe hase issue, so Ihat an atlequate lantl coverage of Denmark from 
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the south became a Social Democratic pre-condition for accepting sta-
tioning in Denmark. The basic reasoning seems to have been the same 
which inspired the Danish rejection in 1951 of General Eisenhower's 
idea to make Denmark a heavily armed «hedgehog» from where to 
defend the central front. 21 The Social Democrats seemed to think that a 
strengthening of Danish defence through stationing would be less' 
effective if the approaches were not similarly strengthened. Another 
consideration was that a concentration of military power in Denmark 
might somehow be viewed as provocative by the adversary, i.e. the' 
Soviet Union. 
The theme of non-provocation has a long tradition in Danish security 
policy and, as we have seen, played a role in the alliance discussions of 
1948-49. During the 1950's it gradually became a more prominent 
feature of official policy in conjunction with the relaxation of East-
West tension. As an example, Foreign Minister Ole Bjl'lrn Kraft 
(Cons.) warned the NATO Council meeting in Ottawa September, 
1951, against the increased risks of war which would follow an exagge-
rated rearmament effort. «Although appeasement is to be shunned, 
there are serious dangers in preparing too vigorously for war.»". And in 
early 1953 Mr. Kraft responded to a Soviet memo on the stationing 
question which had also touched upon the alleged special status of 
Bornholm by indicating that Denmark would always be aware of the 
special considerations called for by Bornholm's geographic position in 
the middle of the Baltic." (In practice, this has led to Bornholm being 
closed to Allied military units, e.g. also in connection with NATO 
exercises; Denmark also restricts its participation in NATO exercises in 
the Eastern Baltic). 
With Stalin's death in March 1953 and the ensuing «thaw» in inter-
national politics, non-provocation and detente became even more 
important motivations to the Social Democrats. In a speech to the party 
congress in June Hans Hedtoft argued that the possibilities for detente 
and a peaceful solution of East-West conflicts should be tried out 
«before taking new steps» and wound up concluding that the Social 
Democrats had decided not to accept the offer of permanent stationing 
«in the present situatiom>. A few months later the party was back in 
government and the no stationing became official policy. The decision 
was subsequently acquiesced in by the Liberals and the Conservatives 
and rapidly ceased to be controversial. NATO also accepted the deci-
sion gracefully. To explain this, the limitations on the ban should be 
26 
Iloticcu. IL applieu anu applies to «present cOlluitions» only. i.c. in 
practice to peacetime conuitions, and only to Denmark proper. Furth-
ennore, it does not apply to Allied participation in exercises in Den-
mark or to various preparations for the introduction of Allied reinforce-
ments in a crisis or in wartime. In fact, from the early 1950's the 
defence of Denmark has continued to be predicated on the rapid intro-
duction of such reinforcements if needed. 
Danish Nuclear Weapons Policy 1957-60 
A few years after the base decision, similar motivations produced a ban 
on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Denmark «under prevailing 
circumstances». Since 1949 Denmark had tacitly accepted the U.S. 
nuclear deterrence as NATO's backbone, and in 1954 she went along 
with the NATO Council decision to base the defence of NATO Europe 
upon the immediate use of nuclear weapons, including the new tactical 
nuclear weapons with the US Army in Germany. But the Danish atti-
tude was always very cautious and low-profiled, so when the question 
arose in 1957 whether nuclear weapons should be stationed on Danish 
soil. the security policy consensus once more threatened to crack. The 
Liberals and Conservatives as well as the military leaders pleaded for 
the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Danish defence forces along 
with most other NATO countries, while the Social Democrats were 
against. During the election campaign in the spring of 1957 (at a time 
when Denmark had only been offered conventional versions of Nike 
anu Honest John missiles) Prime Minister H.C. Hansen indicated his 
opposition to nuclear weapons in Denmark," and after the election he 
formed a coalition government with the Radicals and the Justice Party 
which in its official government declaration stated that an offer of nuc-
lear weapons would be declined «under present conditions»." 
This official. but still rather hypothetical no to nuclear weapons was 
strengthened in December 1957 when the deployment of medium-
range missiles in Europe and the delivery of nuclear weapons to NATO 
armies under the dual-key arrangement came up for decision in the 
NATO Council. During the meeting the Danish and Norwegian 
gov~rnments were in close contact, and Denmark supported the Nor-
wegian proposal to postpone the deployment decision on mcuiulll-
rang.e missiles. Both c(llIlltrics also stareu their unwillingness Lo receive 
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nuclear weapons on their soil under prevailing conditions. arguing 
mainly on the need to improve the intemational climate and to promote 
disarmament and detente." A month later H.C. Hansen explained the 
government's stand in greater detail in the Folketing: 
"Our no must be seen on the background of Denmark' s geographical 
position. Considering the range of modern weapons it is difficullli, 
say, which countries will be most exposed in case of wur in the 
future, but it is a historical fact that plans for derence measures in the 
area which Denmark belongs to, have- during the NATO's Iife-tim~ 
- attracted the attention of the eastern countries to a special degree 
and called forth strong reactions. It must, therefore, be of impor-
tance, that we - in our area - refrain from measures, which - even 
unjustly - might be construed as a provocation and hence impede 
detente .... »" 
In 1960 the no to nuclear weapons was further consolidated when the 
opposition parties «regretfully recognized» that the defence agreement 
of that year would not include the introduction of nuclear weapons, and 
from the early 1960's this policy reached the status of a de facto immu-
table cornerstone of Danish alliance policy. The Liberals and Conser-
vatives conceded this when they ceased to argue for nuclear weapons a 
few years later (1964). 
, The decision to ban nuclear weapons from Danish soil was taken 
mainly for domestic reasons and as part of "C» (i.e. «cooperative») 
strategy in the adversary game. Non-provocation and international 
detente were probably the main motivations for the decision. Conside-
rations of alliance solidarity seemingly played a secondary role, but the 
decision also was part of the alliance game. For one thing, the external 
pressure upon Denmark was slight, as the United States and other 
NATO allies readily accepted the Danish reservations and apparently 
never have tried to contest them. If this is so, it is probably because 
NATO sees little military need for nuclear weapons in Denmark, but 
also because the conditional nature of the reservation, especially its 
limitation to peacetime. Furthermore, at least until recently, Denmark' 
has always accepted NATO's general defence posture and its implicit 
dependence on the use of nuclear weapons if necessary for defence 
purposes. 
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V" The Politics of 
Consolidation 1962-78 
By Ule early 1960's the major features of Denmark's alliance policy had 
been laid out. The organizational framework had been perfected with 
the establishment of BALTAP which proved to function smoothly and 
satisfactorily. A certain modest defence effort had been agreed upon 
and was maintained through the new indexing procedure; furthermore, 
the broad defence settlement of 1960 had established a model for future 
defence agreements. A base policy had been formulated and acquired 
broad domestic support, and the corresponding no to nuclear weapons 
policy was gradually being accepted by its erstwhile domestic oppo-
nents. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union a mixed policy of deterrence and 
defence on one side and reassurance and non-provocation on the other 
had been formulated since about 1953. 
During the next two decades this general pattern was maintained and 
further consolidated. Despite occasional friction between the major 
parties to the consensus and the defection of the Radicals in the mid-
1,)70's the basic domestic consensus between Social Democrats, Libe-
rals and Conservatives held at least until 1979. In relation to NATO, 
only few problems arose, and in general the evolution of NATO poli-
cies and strategies was consonant with Danish preferences. And vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union the early tentative efforts at a detente-oriented 
policy was given wider scope when detente became part of NATO's 
basic policy stance with the Harmel formula of 1967. 
Alliance and Detente Policy 
In the mid- I 960' s Foreign Minister Per Hrekkerup (1962-66, Soc. 
Dem.) tried to stake out a more independent Danish profile in East-
West relations by taking up contacts with the Soviet Union and especi-
ally with the smaller East European countries, both on a bilateral basis 
and within the so-called Group of Nine. JO He also supported at an early 
date the idea of a European security conference, which was broached 
by the Soviet Union at the time. In 1966 the Danish government offici-
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ally suggested to the NATO Council that the initiative should be con-
sidered in a positive spirit only to receive a rather frosty reaction. How-
ever, the threatening divergence between Danish detente policy and the 
official NATO policy towards the East was covered over when NATO 
in 1967 adopted the Harmel formula and when the alliance's detente 
policy got off the following year with the so-called Reykjavik Signal. 
This development was instrumental in quelling a certain malaise 
about the alliance which had been spreading on the left wing of the 
security policy consenSUs after the mid-1960's, not only over the pro-
blems of detente, but also over the war in Indochina. The Radicals 
started venting the idea of a referendum to decide about continued 
NATO membership after 1969, and there were widespread expectati-
ons of a forthcoming «grand debate» during 1965-{j6. But the Harmel 
Report quieted criticism of NATO, and the Warsaw Pact invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968 did the rest. The matter was laid com-
pletely at rest in 1970, when an expert committee which had been set up 
in 1968 by a new coalition of Radicals, Liberals and Conservatives 
(1968-71) concluded that Denmark had no viable alternative to conti-
nued alliance membership." 
Another relevant development in the early 1970's was Denmark's 
membership in the European Communities (EC) as from 1973. This 
also gave her access to the EPC, the budding European Political Coo-
peration which came to play a significant role in developing the West-
ern positions at the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe 
(CSCE) from 1973 to 1975. In this context, Denmark played an active 
role, especially within the area of human relations «<basket no. 3»). 
The problems of NATO's nuclear weapons policy also found a fairly 
satisfactory solution in this period as seen from a Danish perspective. 
Denmark did not participate in the periodic European compliants in the 
1950's and 1960's about the credibility of the American nuclear gua-
rantee to Europe, nor in the European critique of the new flexible 
response strategy which was designed to beef up its credibility. Succes-
sive Danish governments were generally content with the U . S. nuclear 
monopoly and the way it was administered, and were opposed to efforts 
to increase European participation in the actual management of 
NATO's nuclear deterrent. In the 1960's Denmark opposed the MLF 
proposal, both because the government saw no political or strategic 
rationale for it, and because it might threaten the Danish ban on nuclear 
weapons on her soil. The Danish government made it clear (as did 
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Norway) that though it would not go as far as vetoing the force, MLF 
would not get access to Danish waters and harbours. Denmark the-
refore also welcomed the alternative to MLF, when the latter was scutt-
led, i.e. the creation of the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee 
(NDAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in NATO. From the 
late 1960's Denmark was a permanent, though not very active partici-
pant in NPG and came to appreciate the increased knowledge of nuclear 
affairs and the marginal influence upon alliance planning which parti-
cipation gave her. Until the INF issue became politicizied in 1979, this 
participation in NPG was domestically uncontroversial and little noti-
ced. 
Defence Policy 1960-78 
Although a broad consensus over defence policy was the main charac-
teristic of the period, certain cracks appeared. From the mid-1970's the 
Radicals lapsed back into general defence policy opposition, and in 
1968 its demand for a (minor) cut in the defence budget as part of the 
building of a government coalition with the Conservatives and the 
Liberals gave rise to a major crisis for the broad consensus when the 
Social Democrats chose to officially annul its adherence to the current 
defence agreement. In 1970 the party (now in opposition) presented a 
new defence proposal which in certain respects broke with the existing 
defence structure, i.a. by calling for a thorough professionalization of 
the defence forces and for a break with the concept of forward defence, 
at least as far as defence in the Baltic was concerned. After the Social 
Democrats returned to power in 1971, consensus was gradually resto-
red, and in 1973a new defence settlement once more united the parties 
to the settlement of 1960, i.e. Social Democrats, Radicals, Liberals, 
and Conservatives." The major feature of the new defence structure 
was a decisive increase in the number of professionals in the services 
and a corresponding deemphasis on conscription. Another important 
feature was that the entire defence budget, including material procure-
ment, was now indexed against inflation in prices and wages. This 
shielded to some extent the defence budget against cUls when the eco-
nomy tOOK a general downward turn after 1973, but it also made it quite 
difficult for the government to participate in the attempts of the Carter 
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period to increase European defence efforts in real terms. The govern-
ment (at the time a Social Democratic minority government led by 
Anker Jf/Jrgensen) subscribed in 1978 to the Long-Term Defence Pro-
gramme in NATO, including an annual three percent rise in real terms. 
but also had to point out that increases would be impossible during the 
current agreement (1977-81), and that future increase would be subject 
to political negotiations. 
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VI. The Politics of Strife 
1979 87 
Until the late 1970's Denmark's alliance policy remained largely 
uncontroversial. In the wake of economic prosperity and international 
detente a certain balance had been found between policies.in the dome-
stic, alliance and adversary games. But all of a sudden this balance and 
the domestic consensus behind it threatened to break down, and since 
1979 almost all aspects of official security policy have become heavily 
contested between the Social Democrats on one side and the bourgeois 
parties on the other.)J 
It began in the Autumn of 1979, when a newly-formed Social 
Democratic government led by Anker Jllrgensen had to tackle the diffi-
cult issues connected with NATO's dual-track decision. Its handling of 
it gave rise to internal dissatisfaction in the governing party as well as to 
bitter recriminations between government and opposition. During the 
following years other issues have surfaced to strain the traditional secu-
rity policy consensus between the Social Democratic and the bourgeois 
parties, such as defence policy and the proposed nuclear weapon-free 
zone in Scandinavia. After September 1982, when a bourgeois govern-
ment coalition led by Paul Schltiter (Cons.) took over after the Jjjrgen-
sen government, conflicts over security policy have escalated further, 
and since then security policy has been part and parcel of the domestic 
policy game. 
Security Policy and the Domestic Policy 
Game 
To understand the complexities of this game the parliamentary situation 
of the present government should be taken into consideration. 
The Schltiter government is a minority coalition of four bourgeois 
parties, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Center Democrats and the 
Christian People's Party. which between them command a total of 78 
manuates out of 179 in the present Folketing ( 1984-). In most domestic 
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the government is supported by the Radical party whose 10 seats are 
enough to give it a working majority vis-a-vis the Social Democrats, 
the Socialist People's Party and the Left Socialists who between them 
command 82 mandates. In certain policy areas the support of the Radi-
cal party is withdrawn, however, most notably in security policy, 
where the party does support the basic policy of NATO membership,' 
but is opposed to most specific policies, such as defence policy and 
nuclear weapons policy. To command a majority in security policy 
questions the government parties are therefore dependent upon the tra-' 
ditional security policy alliance with the Social Democrats. This alli-
ance still survives on some issues like defence policy but has broken 
down over others, most notably nuclear weapons policy. 
As a consequence, there has been since late 1982 three different 
security pOlicy majorities in the Danish F olketing in addition to the 
basic working majority of the government: I) a broad coalition consist-
ing of the government parties, the Progress Party, the Social Democrats 
and the Radicals which supports NATO membership in general; 2) a 
coalition of the same parties minus the Radicals which also underwrites 
defence policy, and 3) a new majority coalition consisting of Social 
Democrats, Radicals and the two left-wing parties which has largely 
determined Danish nuclear weapons policy since late 1982. 
This so-called «alternative majority» has mainly manifested itself 
through the adoption of parliamentary resolutions. Since late 1982 
about twenty such resolutions, which - by expressing the sense of the 
F olketing - are eo ipso part of official security policy, have been pas-
sed, most of them against the votes of the government parties; on a few 
resolutions the government parties have abstained - and only one has 
been passed with their votes. 
Nevertheless, the government has decided to «live with» and acqui-
esce in these resolutions in order to stay in power and to salvage its 
domestic programme of budgetary retrenchment and economic recon-
struction. As a result the contours of official Danish security policy 
have been blurred, to say the least. The government is constitutionally 
obliged to follow and respect the resolutions of the Folketing, whether 
it has voted for them or not. In practice, this has forced it to insist on a 
number of reservations to recent NATO decisions and communiques; 
together with Greece, Denmark has become - to the acute discomfort of 
the goverment- a «footnote member» of NATO. On the other hand, the 
government feels free to voice their own views on the disputed issues in 
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NATO meetings and elsewhere and to interpret the parliamentary reso-
lutions more or less as they see fit. The government can have this lati-
tude of interpretation in the knowledge that the alternative majority 
cannot agree on toppling it, and that the coalition because of disagree-
ment on security and other policy issues cannot form the basis of an 
alternative government. The alternative majority is powerful, but only 
as opposition. 
Factors of Change in Danish Security Policy 
To explain the breakdown of domestic consensus it is important to note 
that the polarization of views between the bourgeios government par-
ties on the one hand and the Social Democratic opposition party on the 
other is not a specific Danish phenomenon, but has taken place in most 
North European countries during the last few years. 
An explanation must therefore include other than domestic factors. 
Basically, it can be seen as resulting from broad, interrelated forces of 
change in the Western world, which have affected international as well 
as domestic politics since the late 1970's and exerted strong pressures 
upon the participation of the Social Democratic parties in the NATO 
«mainstream». 
First, the gradual erosion of detente and the onset of the «second cold 
war» squashed their hopes for a continued relaxation of international 
tension and increasing cooperation between East and West in Europe 
and instead stepped up demands and pressures for alliance solidarity 
and increased defence budgets. Secondly, and related to this trend, a 
conservative tendency set in in many NATO countries, most notably 
the United States, emboldening bourgeois parties to take on more con-
servative positions, both in domestic and foreign policy. Polarization 
between Social Democratic and bourgeois parties increased further, as 
bourgeois parties gradually took over power in Northern Europe in the 
1979-82 period, relegating former influential Social Democratic par-
ties to ineffective opposition. 
In the case of the Danish Social Democrats, going into opposition 
has had a significant impact on the evolution of its security policy. The 
transition into opposition has been temperamentally difficult for the 
party after having been for two generations the «natural» government 
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party in Denmark. Furthermore, in Denmark - as distinct from other 
countries where a similar transfer of power took place - the transfer was 
not total, as it turned up that, by allying with the Radicals and the 
left-wing parties or, alternatively, with the government parties, the 
Social Democrats were able to remain the umpire of security policy-
making. 
But transition into opposition accelerated rather than initiated chan-
ges in the party's security policy position. As the preceding analysis 
shows these changes are broadly within the security policy «tradition" 
of the party. As early as 1978 Anker J!2Irgensen, party leader and Prime 
Minister, began to express his concerns over the nuclear arms race and 
NATO's dependence on nuclear deterrence, often in a highly emotional 
way. And after the October 1979 elections a vocal faction of about 
one-fourth of the party's parliamentary group started to express highly 
critical attitudes towards several aspects of official security policy. 
Since then, the party's policy line has been determined by the interplay 
of this group (which has had to some extent the sympathy of Anker 
J!2Irgensen) with a somewhat smaller fraction of defence-minded M. P. s 
and a majority group of pragmatically oriented M.P.s with no great 
interest in security policy as such. This process was, of course, stimula-
ted by factors inside as well as outside the party. From the winter of 
1979-80 party activists started to voice critical attitudes towards the 
traditional party line and to make security policy a delicate issue at 
party conferences. As a consequence, the party leadership has had to 
accept several revisions of the party programme, especially on nuclear 
weapons. These pressures were further reinforced by the new peace 
movement which sprang up in 1980, and the left-wing parties, all of 
which singled out the Social Democratic party as the prime target for 
their campaign to radicalize official security policy.". 
Finally, a potent external factor for change should be mentioned, 
namely the influence of Scandilux, a cooperation forum between the 
Social Democratic parties of the North European NATO countries. 
Since its inception in 1981 Scandilux has been an important input into 
the security policy deliberations of the Danish Social Democrats, espe-
cially in the INF issue where a close interrelation between the trend of 
discussion in Scandilux and the policy positions of the Danish party can 
be demonstrated." . 
While the course of Social Democratic security policy has received 
wide journalistic and analytical attention, the evolution of the govern-
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ment's policies are much less analyzed. 3b While the leading govern-
ment party, the Conservatives, traditionally a champion of NATO soli-
darity and a strong defence, has proven itself quite pragmatic as a 
government party, the second largest coalition party, the Liberals, has 
moved in the opposite direction and tries to give itself a high, ideologi-
cal protile on foreign and security pOlicy. Another small coalition part-
ner, the Center Democrats, is also highly pro-NATO, pro-US and pro-
defence. With the Liberal foreign minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, as 
the prime architect of its security policy, the government as a whole 
takes a more hawkish and ideological position than its constituent par-
ties have usually done. Its willingness, nevertheless, to accept having 
its policy dictated by the alternative majority, gives its policy a certain 
taint of insincerity. 
Alliance and Detente Policy in the 1980' s 
For all the domestic conllict over security policy neither the alliance 
membership nor Denmark's military integration in NATO are very 
much in dispute. As a matter of fact, public support for NATO mem-
bership peaked with 69 per cent in the summer of 1983 when the debate 
over the highly unpopular NATO INF missiles was equally at its peak. 
Moreover, an interesting development is taking place among the left-
wing parties to whom the termination of NATO membership has 
always been a central security policy goal. During 1985and 1986 influ-
ential figures in both the Socialist People's Party and the Left Socialists 
have started arguing that membership in the alliance and even participa-
tion in NATO integration could be acceptable as a platform for increa-
sed influence on the contents of Danish security policy as well as the 
strategies and policies of the alliance. Similarly, the BALTAP arrange-
ment is largely uncontroversial in Danish politics. 
As a matter of fact, the defence of Denmark has become steadily 
more integrated with that of the alliance during the last decade. First, 
cooperation with German forces within BALTAP plays an increasing 
role, both in preparation of the actual defence of Denmark and in the 
planning of the Danish defence contribution to NATO. Secondly, the 
role of Allied reinforcements in defence planning for the BALT AP area 
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has increased. The arrival of Allied reinforcements in an emergency 
has always been an important premise of Danish defence planning, hut 
this premise has been considerably clarified and strengthened since the 
early 1970's. In the 1973 defence agreement it was stated that prepara-
tion for the reception of reinforcements was an important element of 
national security policy (and in accordance with the general ban on' 
stationing); in 1976 Denmark signed the first explicit reinforcement 
agreement with the United States under the COB-programme; and in 
1982 Denmark accepted SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan which' 
includes Allied reinforcements for Denmark, primarily U.S. and Bri-
tish aircraft (some 7 squadrons) and a British infantry brigade. As a 
consequence, a number of bilateral agreements have been concluded 
with the «donor» countries, and a certain amount ofprepositioning has 
taken place, primarily of munitions, fuel etc., but not heavy materiel. 
This development has been rather controversial. The left-wing par-
ties as well as the Radical party have criticized the new reinforcement 
policy for increasing Denmark's integration in NATO and hence also 
the risks of being entrapped and having the national freedom of 
maneuvre curtailed in a crisis. Furthermore, it is being argued that the 
new reinforcement concept is provocative to the Warsaw Pact and that 
the vulnerability of the country has been increased as a result. Such 
fears of entrapment and provocation have exerted a certain influence in 
the Social Democratic party as well. In 1981-82 its left-wing voiced 
very serious concerns about the possibility of prepositioning heavy 
materiel, e.g. for U.S. Marines in Denmark, and this was probably an 
important reason why SACEUR did not include this particular feature 
in the RRP as far as Denmark was concerned. On the other hand, this 
was probably also the reason why the plan makes fewer and less secure 
reinforcement commitments to Denmark than to Norway. These com-
mitments seemed to look even less secure, when it became known in 
early 1987 that the British reinforcement brigade might be either 
abolished/reduced or redirected to Germany as part of British defence 
cuts. 
While cooperation in BALTAP and the formalization of NATO's 
reinforcement policy has led to an increasing integration of the defence 
of Denmark with the alliance defence in general, another - more con- . 
spicuous - trend has led to increasing estrangement and alienation, 
namely the evolution of NATO's nuclear weapons policy. As mentio-
ned, Denmark's membership in the NPG from the late 1960's was 
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uncontroversial as long as participation primarily meant listening in on 
strategic discussions between the United States and her European 
allies. But when the NPG was made the forum in the late 1970's for the 
actual planning of new intermediate missiles (lNP) for NATO, and 
when the NATO Council became the designated decision-making unit 
for their deployment, Denmark was given a larger and much more 
direct role in nuclear decision-making than she had previously played, 
and - as it turned out - a larger role than she was able to play. J7 While 
the present bourgeois government parties have supported INP dep-
loyment from the beginning, and while the Radicals and the socialist 
parties have been strongly opposed, the Social Democrats moved from 
hesitant support in 1979 to outright opposition in 1983. In 1979 the 
Social Democratic government concluded its internal discussions by 
proposing a 6 months' delay of the dual-track decision (in order to test 
the Soviet willingness to negotiate), but acquiesced in the decision 
when this proposal was turned down - much as its predecessor had done 
in 1957. But gradually opposition mounted in the party, and after going 
into opposition it dissociated itself from the deployment part of the 
decision. Using the alternative majority it has forced the government 
since 1983 to footnote NATO communiques in support of INP dep-
loyment and also to stop Danish contributions to NATO's infra-
structure programme as far as INF installations are concerned. Since 
1983 opposition to NATO's nuclear policies have widened. A parlia-
mentary resolution of 1985 opposed the modernization of NATO's tac-
tical nuclear weapons according to the Montebello programme of 1983 
and another resolution is opposed to SDI;" as a consequence the 
government had to insist on another footnote to the communique from 
the NATO defence ministers' meeting in Brussels in May 1986. 
Aside from the obvious domestic aspects of this policy change, it is 
also motivated by external considerations. One is a growing fear of the 
implications of the nuclear arms race. Threat perceptions on the left 
wing are now less linked to the risk of a deliberate aggression from the 
Warsaw Pact than to the destabilizing aspects of the arms race. The 
threat has become more structural, where it used to be concrete and 
actor-oriented. Such perspectives lead to a negative attitude to the role 
of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy and to support for a pronounced 
detente policy aimed at defusing the inherent risks of East-West con-
fnllltation. This nexus of attitudes is responsible for another change in 
the Social Democratic nuclear weapons policy, namely with respect to 
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the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Scandinavia. From being 
highly sceptical in the 1960's and 1970', the party has become increa-
singly positive to the idea over the last few years and has sponsored it in 
several parliamentary resolutions. At present, the zone proposal is at 
the center of the nuclear weapons policy of the Social Democratic 
party. 
The zone concept is considered an ideal instrument both to reduce 
further the potential role of nuclear weapons in Denmark's defence and 
to contribute to international detente. In fact, the peacetime implicati- . 
ons of a Nordic zone as a confidence-building measure are being incre-
asingly stressed, while the potential wartime consequences are down-
played. Detente policy is another field where the parliamentary majo-
rity has parted ways with the general trend in NATO, and especially 
V.S. policy. In the early 1980's the Social Democratic government 
strongly emphasized the negotiation part ofthe dual-track decision, and 
in general argued for the resumption of the detente of the 1970's. At 
present, the alternative majority is characterized by a deeply suspicious 
attitude to the policies of the Reagan Administration both vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union and the Third World. The present government parties 
prefer to take a low profile, but would certainly welcome a return to a 
general Western detente policy. 
Defence Policy in the 1980' s 
While many aspects of alliance politics turned confrontational during 
the 1980's defence policy proper has remained - at least formally - a 
consensus area and continued to be regulated by broad defence settle-
ments between Social Democrats and bourgeois parties." Since 1979 
two major defence agreements have been negotiated covering the 
1981-84 and 1985-87 periods respectively. 
But agreement has been more difficult to arrive at and has involved a 
higher degree of mutual and unilateral concessions than before. In 
1980--81 negotiations dragged on for about 18 months, mainly on the 
budget question with the bourgeois parties insisting on a three percent 
increase according to NATO's LTDP programme, while the Social 
Democrats argued for a zero solution. In the end a compromise was 
struck on a modest increase of some 0.7 percent - which was later 
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e1iminatcd, however, in a deal between the new bourgeois government 
and the Social Democrats a year later. 
In contrast, negotiations in 1984 for a new agreement were swift and 
undramatic, even though they started in an atmosphere of violent clas-
hes between government and opposition over INF. The two situations-
confrontation over INF and compromise over defence - were, how-
ever, intimately linked in the policies of both the Social Democratic 
party and the government parties. 
In the case of the Social Democratic party linkage was provided by 
the claim that its new nuclear weapons policy did not affect the party's 
basic pro-NATO and pro-defence posture. Its willingness to conclude a 
new defence settlement was therefore meant as a signal to friend and 
foe of the limits to its volatility in security policy. On the part of the 
government parties the tmditional defence policy consensus with the 
Social Democrats has always been highly important, and historically 
they have been willing to pay for it by accepting less than satisfactory 
defence agreements. Under the parliamentary circumstances prevailing 
in 1984 where the defence budget might have become a target for the 
alternative majority if the Social Democrats were not tied down by a 
new settlement, such considerations acquired added weight. 
Therefore, even if both parts were motivated to reach an agreement, 
the government parties were, on balance, willingto concede most, and 
on a number of issues the Social Democrats had their way, e.g. with 
respect to their demands for a zero solution for the defence budget and 
for some limitation to its indexation. 
Another important concession to the Social 'Democrats involved the 
beginning phase-out of larger units (frigates and submarines) from the 
Navy. This trend relleets the party's scepticism as to the possibility and 
ad visability of a forward defence posture in the Baltic and its preference 
for a close-range coastal defence with smaller units. 
The issue of forward defence was raised once more in 1986, when 
the Social Democratic party published a new defence proposal in pre-
paration for a new agreement after 1987.'" This proposal marks a furt-
her step away from forward defence by also questioning the present 
Danish contribution to the forward defence of Schleswig-Holstein and 
Jutland, and by linking this scepticism with the support for defensive 
defence, «a non-threatening defensive defence structure, which is a 
defence SytCIll, which by its composition demonstrates peaceful, non-
offensive intentions, but which at the same time is able - in cooperation 
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with other nations - to inflict such losses on an aggressor in and from its 
own area of sovereignty, that an aggression cannot be assumed on befo-
rehand to lead to a successful result for the aggressor». 
Both forward defence and defensive defence (where the Social 
Democratic model is much more conventional than the «pure» models 
discussed by peace researchers and others) are likely to become heat-
edly discussed principles during the next year or so - and both have 
obvious implications for Denmark's role in NATO's defence strategy. 
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VU.. Conclusions 
In this paper two interrelated themes have been pursued. One bears 
upon Denmark's basic relationship to the Atlantic Alliance and her role 
in it; the other one concerns the specific interrelationship of Danish 
policies in three· «games», the alliance game, the adversary game and 
the domestic game. 
Until around 1980 it was still possible to classify Denmark as a loyal 
ally despite her reservations with respect to foreign bases and nuclear 
weapons on her own territory and notwithstanding her modest defence 
effort, for these features were counterbalanced by the fact that Den-
mark seldom questioned official NATO strategies and policies. In 
judging the present Danish alliance policy the current fragmentation of 
the official policy-making process poses a problem. The Schliiter 
government evidently wants to pursue a <<loyal» NATO policy and 
would probablY prefer a more NATO-oriented course than the one fol-
lowed by successive Danish governments up to 1979 - if it were allo-
wed to do so. But due to the parliamentary constellation since 1982, the 
government does not control the making of alliance policy, only its 
implementation, and as a consequence a blurred image of official 
Danish NATO policy emerges. As far as the line pursued by the alterna-
tive parliamentary majority is concerned, Denmark is no longer a 
«loyal» ally, but a rather independent one. Central aspects of alliance 
policy - INF deployment, TNW modernization, the flexible response 
strategy including first-use - are being opposed or questioned; the alli-
ance leader is being severely criticized for its policies over a wide range 
of issues, such as arms control, SDI and Central America; and a number 
of policies and strategies are being propagated which seem incompa-
tible with an unchanged participation in NATO, e.g. a Nordic nuclear 
weapon-free zone and defensive defence. Even though the government 
in its implementation of these policies has succeeded in blunting their 
impact, the official alliance policy can hardly be termed «loyal» any 
longer. 
If this is so, it is a retlection of the increasing importance of the 
domestic game in deciding the security policy of the country. As we 
have seen, domestic concerns have played a major role in determining 
alliance policy since the late 1940's but their role has increased percep-
tibly since the trauitional consensus coalition started to crack in the 
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early 1980's. Consequently considerations concerning the alliance and 
adversary games play a diminishing role in deciding Denmark's poli-
cies within the Alliance. 
In the alliance game proper, Denmark has traditionally pursued a 
mixture of «C» (cooperation) and «0» (defection) strategies. «C» stra-
tegies with respect to alliance organization, its political balance bet-' 
ween the United States and others, and its basic strategies and policies. 
But a moderate «0» strategy with respect to the application of these 
policies to Denmark's own security policy posture. The reservations 
concerning bases and nuclear weapons are the best examples of this 
feature. Since around 1980, this traditional balance has tipped away 
from «C» strategies, even though cooperation in the strictly military 
"field has actually increased over the last decade. What has changed is 
the "traditional acceptance (not always enthusiastic) of the alliance 
«mainstream», and the adoption of independent positions on a number 
of issues which are central to alliance cohesion. 
In the adversary game a similar shift of balance has occured from a 
mixture of «0» and «C» strategies to a strategy dominated by coopera-
tive elements. Danish security policy basically rests upon a «0» stra-
tegy of deterrence and defence towards the Soviet Union, but concilia-
tory «C» strategies (whose temperamental roots can be found in the 
Danish neutrality tradition) began to assert themselves as soon as the 
Cold War had peaked, e.g. in the 1953 ban on foreign bases. During the 
1960's and 1970's a high-profiled detente policy was pursued, but 
without questioning the basic notion of an adversary relationship with 
the Soviet Union. 
In the 1980's the adversary relationship is less pronounced. Threat 
perceptions are changing away from the traditional notion of the Soviet 
Union as the chief threat to peace and security in Europe, and instead 
the arms race or the U.Se-Soviet confrontation as such are seen as the 
main threat. Furthermore, the idea of «common security», i.e. that 
security cannot be found in confrontation with, but only in cooperation 
with the adversary, is gaining ground and has become the official secu- . 
rity policy doctrine of the Social Democratic party. 41 Similar attitudes 
are reflected in the opposition to forward defence, which some argue is 
provocative, and in support for the principle of defensive defence. In -
" such a context, «0» strategies towards the adversary tend to become 
played down, while «C» strategies are being emphasized. 
In short, what seems to be happening is that the traditional mixture of 
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«C» and «D» strategies in the alliance and adversary game is being 
replaced with alliance strategies with preponderance of «D» elements 
and an adversary strategy heavily based on «C» elements. As the analy-
sis of Danish policies before the 1980's shows, these trends are not 
novel; what is new, is the balance between them. To what extent these 
trends will perm;mently determine Danish alliance policy is unclear at 
the present moment, however. As mentioned, they are contrary to the 
policy of alliance loyalty which the government would like to pursue, 
and it is no foregone conclusion that they would be allowed to dominate 
totally in the alliance policy of a future Social Democratic-led govern-
ment. Most likely it would steer a course somewhere in between the 
traditional alliance policy and the one it tries to force through in opposi-
tion, i.e. play the role of a moderately independent ally. 
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